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Internalization of Customary International Law:
An Historical Perspective
Edward M. Morgant
[T]he heroes of the book are what can be loosely called 'methods of compo-
sition'. It is as if a painter said: look, here I'm going to show you not the




Analyzing an area of substantive law from an historical perspective
offers the prospect of comprehending deeper structures that might other-
wise defy explanation. The unfamiliar quality of the terminology and
conceptual posturing characterizing antiquated legal discourse detaches
the student from the force of contemporary rhetorical modes and propels
him toward the discovery of otherwise obscured structural patterns. In-
deed, the very distance in time between student and subject matter tends
to demystify the given field of inquiry, allowing it to be understood in
terms of some underlying explanation which was unarticulated, and gen-
erally unperceived, by actual participants.
The emergence of modern internalization doctrine-the absorption of
international customary norms into the domestic sphere-has been
marked by attempts to sort out the various distinctions applied by courts
in adjudicating international legal claims. At the same time, however,
contemporary doctrinal pronouncements have become increasingly in-
consistent in their own categorical schemes.1 For every holding through
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1. Thus, for example, despite the frequent insistence by U.S. courts that "[i]nternational
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction," The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), it is also strenu-
ously asserted that when an agency of government "adopts a policy contrary to a trend in
international law... the courts must accept the latest act of that agency." Tag v. Rogers, 267
F.2d 664, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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which international law establishes a judicially-determinable boundary
limiting the exercise of state power,? a counterpoint case implies a "ple-
nary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations."'3 And for every indi-
cation that international law binds actions by a "recognized state or one
of its officials acting under color of state law,"'4 there are positivist ex-
pressions that international legal rules depend upon the prior consent of
sovereigns. 5
This article examines the domestic enforcement, or internalization, of
international customary norms. More specifically, it explores the transi-
tion from early nineteenth-century jurisprudence, which first examined
the scope of the executive's foreign affairs and military powers, through
the case law of the classical liberal genre, which appeared a century later,
to the contemporary judicial implementation of international human
rights norms. To this end, the article will discuss four cases reflecting
2. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (kidnapping criminal de-
fendant from foreign country); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (torture by
state officials).
3. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
4. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
5. See, e.g., I.I.T. v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (international offense
must be of mutual, not merely several, concern among nation states). These latter cases have,
in turn, contained assurances that "the very nature of [such] executive decisions as to foreign
policy is political, not judicial," Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948) (applying "political question" doctrine to presidential orders concerning interna-
tional air routes), so that sovereigns' acts are declared unreviewable "even if the complaint
alleges that ... [an act] violates customary international law." Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (applying "act of state" doctrine to expropriations by
foreign sovereign).
It may be noted that in this article the terms "sovereign" and "executive" are attributed
multiple meanings, in keeping with the combined domestic and international themes of the
cases under consideration. In American constitutional parlance, "executive" refers to the ex-
ecutive branch of government deriving powers under Article II, and is counterposed here
against the judicial branch. The "sovereign" in the American system, of course, is said to be
the people themselves, who have in the Constitution delegated their sovereign powers to the
different branches of government. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(original and supreme will of the people organizes and limits government, and assigns to differ-
ent departments their respective powers); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467-68 (A. Hamilton)
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Constitution supreme because the intention of the people must be pre-
ferred to the intention of their agents).
In the British system, and in international law generally, the sovereign is the Crown (i.e., the
executive) in its capacity as head of state. See Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney Gen-
eral for Ontario ("The Labour Conventions Case"), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (ratification of
treaty in British constitutional law entails executive act of Royal assent). In international
discourse, however, acts of the head of state are significant beyond the mere executive capacity
of such an officer, and are said to embody the acts of the entire nation. See Australia v.
France; New Zealand v. France ("The Nuclear Test Cases"), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (statements
of President of the Republic as head of state are, in international relations, acts of the French
state). Thus, the American notion of sovereignty flowing from the bottom up, and the British
conception of sovereignty flowing from the top down, may be seen to merge.
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distinct phases in the historical development of internalization doctrine.
The first two decisions are "prize" cases, 6 disputes which arose when a
U.S. ship captured a ship flying an enemy flag and claimed the vessel and
cargo as prizes of war. Within this context, Chief Justice Marshall first
asserted the judiciary's preeminence over the executive in the process of
internalization. 7 In so doing, he deployed an embryonic rhetoric of indi-
vidual rights, and provided a framework in which the articulation of pri-
vate rights in international disputes was later to emerge.8 The third case
in the series involves judicial recognition of the acts of a de facto govern-
ment, and embodies the crystallization of a "rights" approach to inter-
nalized claims.9 The fourth involves an alien tort action premised on a
violation of international law, and reflects in its analysis a transnational
application of liberal legalism.10 These cases document the development
of an adjudicative form which assimilates some international legal claims
to the positions of litigants asserting individual rights, while excluding
other such claims from the domestic judicial process.
This article argues that two opposing visions of the international legal
order underlie the various doctrinal distinctions and linguistic maneuvers
that permeate the case law in this field. Thus, rather than attempting to
find coherence in the language of the diverse opinions, this article at-
tempts to discern the structural patterns which run through the courts'
otherwise conflicting analyses. These patterns will emerge more clearly
through an historical presentation, in which outmoded judicial discourse
becomes particularly unpersuasive. In this way, one can see how the
doctrinal changes represent shifting techniques with which to mask the
conflict between two intractable visions defining legality in the transna-
tional context. In a nutshell, these visions correspond roughly to the two
sides of the debate over the nature of federalism which dominated Amer-
ican constitutional thinking until the Civil War: the compact theory and
Chief Justice Marshall's version of popular sovereignty.
I. The Background of Eighteenth-Century Case Law
To place Chief Justice Marshall's 1815 decision in The Nereide in his-
torical context, it may be helpful to summarize the English common law
on internalization at the time of the American Revolution. Perhaps the
most logical place to start is the frequently-cited decision of Lord Mans-
6. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
7. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815).
8. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
9. M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
10. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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field in Triquet v. Bath. I' The case involved a suit by the creditors of one
Christopher Bath, who had engaged in considerable trade both as a
merchant in England and Ireland and as a "commissary of stores
abroad" during his employment as the Bavarian foreign minister's do-
mestic servant. 12 Although the legal issue was framed in terms of Bath's
liability for a specific set of debts, the delicate question of the Crown's
relations with its foreign sovereign counterparts lingered just beneath the
surface.
Lord Mansfield's opinion indicated, as a preliminary matter, that Par-
liament's grant of immunity from judicial process to representatives of
foreign states was merely declaratory of the law of nations. 13 The impli-
cation, however, was not quite that an English court would have been
prevented from enforcing an action against diplomatic personnel in the
absence of the governing legislation; rather, the opinion suggested that
the Act was required to facilitate the performance of the various protocol
and ethical duties required for cordial relations among sovereigns. In-
deed, as Lord Mansfield notes, the diplomatic immunity statute was en-
acted because of an incident in which the Russian ambassador to
England was arrested. A copy of the Act itself, "finely illuminated by an
ambassador extraordinary,"' 14 was then sent in satisfaction of the King's
gentlemanly duty to the Czar.
Thus, although Lord Mansfield is often credited with taking an initial
step toward the internalization of transnational norms, his opinion in
Triquet applies only partially Blackstone's statement that "the law of na-
tions ... is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and is held
to be a part of the law of the land."'15 That is, at this juncture in history,
the positions of the judiciary and the Crown in advancing national inter-
ests in foreign affairs were conceived as aligned. For this reason, the
mid-eighteenth century internalization cases fell short of articulating an
international parallel to the developing domestic law concept of executive
subordination to the rule of law.' 6
11. 97 Eng. Rep. 936 (K.B. 1764).
12. Id. at 936.
13. Act for Preserving the Privileges of Ambassadors, and other Public Ministers of For-
eign Princes and States, 1708, 7 Anne, ch. 12 [hereinafter Act].
14. Triquet v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. at 937.
15. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 67 (1823).
16. Although the British constitutional concept of the subordination of the Crown and its
officers to the rule of law was not fully articulated until Dicey's late nineteenth century pro-
nouncements that there could be no "exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedi-
ance to law," A. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202 (9th ed. 1945), the notion does
appear in inchoate form in earlier periods. Thus, Blackstone indicated that the courts could
restrain the Crown's power in cases of interference with private property even if this entailed
confrontation with the personal will of the sovereign. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
Vol. 12:63, 1987
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By the time of the American Revolution, the ethical duties of the sov-
ereign in foreign affairs that had been internalized by Lord Mansfield
were enforceable only insofar as such enforcement would support the ex-
ecutive's positions in the international arena. The question remained,
however, whether the judiciary could use internalization of international
norms to expand its role to encompass something other than support.
Could the courts, in the guise of implementing international law, pursue
a course of action with respect to foreign sovereigns that the executive
would not or could not undertake? The possibility of such a develop-
ment posed a problem that had not previously been considered. In its
judicially-internalized form, the law of nations, as a normative structure
within which the interaction among sovereigns takes place, threatened to
undermine the very sovereignty upon which international legality is said
to be based.
In the next stage of development of the internalization doctrine, the
judiciary adopted a posture of supplementing executive inaction rather
than merely complementing executive action. This transition empha-
sized a conceptual gap between identifying the source of international
norms as lying in sovereign consent, and implementing such norms in the
face of sovereign restraint. To disguise the contradiction, courts em-
ployed rhetorical techniques which avoided the intrinsic dilemma
presented by the concept of sovereignty. With- its implication that sover-
eign power is restricted only by one sovereign's willingness to accommo-
date other sovereign equals, sovereignty could not be reconciled with a
judicial capacity to enforce international, or extra-sovereign, legal norms.
The rhetoric of honor, which permeated Lord Mansfield's characteri-
zation of inter-sovereign relations, was, by the 1780's, supplanted by ex-
pressions of convenience in the conduct of foreign affairs. This rhetoric
of convenience became the primary way to describe international behav-
ior, and was the medium by which the contradiction between absolute
sovereignty and internalization was masked. For example, in Respublica
v. De Longchamps,17 a Pennsylvania case pre-dating the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the defendant was convicted of a crime against international custom
(internalized by the court as a common law offense) for insulting and
threatening bodily harm to the French consul-general. The nature of the
offense and the character of the insult 8 seem to have been tailor-made
for a Lord Mansfield-type analysis of the etiquette required of one sover-
254-57 (1823). For a general historical overview, see Jaffee & Henderson, Judicial Review and
the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 LAW Q. REV. 345 (1956).
17. 1 Dall. Il1 (Pa. 1784).
18. "Je vous deshonnerera, policon, coquin." Id. at 111.
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eign in his relationship with the representatives of another. Yet the deci-
sion centered on the inconvenience to Franco-American relations caused
by the impugned act; the diplomat "must have been prevented from pay-
ing a [sic] proper attention to his appointments, which is certainly a vio-
lation of the law of nations."' 9
As a rhetorical technique, the emphasis on convenience effectively
shifts attention away from the contradiction between sovereign control of
foreign relations and the judiciary's expansion of its influence into this
area. The antagonism between the theoretical source and the actual op-
eration of international law is never addressed in the cases that follow.
Just as Triquet and De Longchamps employed the rhetoric of honor and
inconvenience to mask the underlying tension, so the following four cases
use various rhetorical devices to manage this conflict. In all of these
cases, then, the judicial dilemma is solved by resort to a form of argu-
ment which makes it seem to disappear.
II. The Development of Internalization Doctrine: Four Cases
A. The Nereide
The Nereide case arose in this context of rhetorical transition. Given
the relatively timid positions taken in the prior case law, Chief Justice
Marshall's assertion in this case of judicial authority over the actions of
an American armed vessel went far beyond a mere restatement of Black-
stone's earlier definition of internalization.20 The U.S. ship had seized
and claimed as a prize of war cargo, belonging to a neutral, that was
found in the hold of a belligerent ship. The cargo's owner, Manuel Pinto,
was a Spanish subject who had chartered the British vessel, the Nereide,
to transport his goods from London to Buenos Aires during the height of
the War of 1812. Pinto's successful argument for the return of his mer-
chandise was twofold. He first asserted that neither he nor his property
had "acquired a hostile character" by virtue of his brief domicile in Eng-
land.21 Second, Pinto insisted he w~s free as a neutral to place his cargo
in either a belligerent or a neutral ship. His victory, as phrased by coun-
sel, represented a recognition of and respect for "the rights of neutral
commerce" under international law.22
Marshall's contribution was to employ the rhetoric of legal "rights" to
transmute the moral duties and conveniences of a previous age into a
19. Id. at 114 (arguments of Attorney General).
20. See supra text accompanying note 15.
21. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 392.
22. Id. at 392-95 (arguments of counsel for the appellant).
Vol. 12:63, 1987
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force capable of restricting, rather than merely facilitating, executive ac-
tion. Any number of rights were said to be involved in the controversy
over the Nereide and its cargo. According to Marshall, these rights gov-
erned the conduct of nations as a natural outgrowth of the reasoning
process. The merchant's right of neutral commerce was counterposed
against the belligerent's right of arrest and search, with the latter de-
scribed as a mere subset of the right of capture. In addition, the right of
capture was described as antagonistic to the neutral's right to choose a
vessel of any flag.23 Reason alone reconciled the conflict between these
rights. Marshall asked rhetorically: "What is this right of search? Is it a
substantive and independent right wantonly, and in the pride of power,
to vex and harass neutral commerce, because there is a capacity to do so?
or to indulge the idle and mischievous curiosity of looking into neutral
trade?" 24 The Court articulated the scope of a neutral's right to choose
any vessel, including that of a belligerent state, in a similar fashion. "The
neutral has no control over the belligerent right to arm," reasoned Mar-
shall; "ought he to be accountable for the exercise of it?"25 Using a de-
ductive style of discourse, Marshall derived the rights of the parties by
noting that they flowed naturally from the relations at issue; this invoca-
tion of rationality allowed him to manage the conflict between sover-
eignty and internalization. As a practical result, the executive's power to
act arbitrarily in foreign affairs was circumscribed by an extra-constitu-
tional rule of reason.26
Although Marshall's analysis did in some way limit U.S. sovereignty,
the approach was conceptually distinct from the classical liberal formula-
tion of individual rights against the state which would later develop.
Most notably, the case failed to mention, and was indeed premised on the
23. These rights traced their source to the realm of inevitable logic: the right of capture
might be deduced from the very state of belligerency, the right of passage from the very state of
neutrality, and so on. Marshall stated: "The rule that the goods of an enemy found in the
vessel of a friend are prize of -war, and that the goods of a friend found in the vessel of an
enemy are to be restored, is believed to be a part of the original law of nations.... This rule is
founded on the simple and intelligible principle that war gives a full right to capture the goods
of an enemy, but gives no right to capture'the goods of a friend." Id. at 418-19. He then
reiterated: "That a neutral may lawfully put his goods on board a belligerent ship for convey-
ance on the ocean, is universally recognized as the original law of nations. It is, as has been
already stated, founded on the plain and simple principle that the property of a friend remains
his property wherever it may be found." Id. at 425.
24. Id. at 427.
25. Id. at 426.
26. The power to conduct foreign and military affairs is said to derive from the article II,
§ 2 power to act as Commander-in-Chief and to make treaties and appoint ambassadors, the
article II, § 3 power to receive ambassadors, and the article II, § 3 duty to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." See generally Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Re-
lations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
39-44 (1972).
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absence of, a public/private distinction. Pinto's right to protect his pri-
vate property was not a right automatically granted to an individual, but
was recognizable as a claim only insofar as it could be incorporated into
Spain's right of neutral commerce. This explains the extensive and, to
contemporary ears, bizarre discussion of the "friend or foe" character of
Pinto's goods. 27 The dispute before the Court, though arising as a claim
to title in private property, was presented as an international conflict be-
tween sovereign states. The international claims, in turn, were assimi-
lated through the rhetoric of rights and deductive reasoning to the claims
of private plaintiffs.28
For Marshall the judiciary was not, however, the final arbiter of all
international controversies involving the United States. Some questions
of foreign relations followed "the devious and intricate path of politics" '29
and were thus unabsorbed by the discussion of rights.30 The implication
of Marshall's analysis was that, while the judiciary may appropriately
circumscribe executive action in the name of individual rights, the other
branches of government must be free to operate when national concerns
are at stake. In Marshall's words, "it is not for its Courts to interfere
with the proceedings of the nation and to thwart its views. ' ' 31 Thus,
when a court internalizes international law, it restrains the exercise of
sovereignty not only in the traditional sense of executive action, but also
in the sense of popular sovereignty-the wishes of the community as a
whole.
As a corollary to such judicial activism, the relegation of some types of
international relations to the political sphere creates a realm in which the
rule of reason does not operate, and the notion of rights is allowed to
succumb to the nation's collective, and arbitrary, will. Without a public/
private framework, however, the line between sovereignty and individual
rights is nearly impossible to draw. Nevertheless, Marshall's opinions
represent a rudimentary attempt to employ the language of rights to
deemphasize the contradiction between the nation's sovereign interests
and the domestic judicial enforcement of international law.
27. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 389-412.
28. The dispute is said to be readily resolved through "the exercise of that cold investigat-
ing faculty which ought always to belong to those who sit on this bench." Id. at 430.
29. Id. at 423.
30. A prime example is the issue of retaliation against Spain for its failure to provide
Americans with rights of passage similar to the right claimed by Pinto. Id. at 422.
31. Id.
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B. The Paquete Habana
The next case represents both a significant advancement of the liberal
paradigm with respect to international legal claims and a retreat from the
extent of Marshall's internalization. The appellant, master of a small
fishing boat operating out of Havana and flying the Spanish flag, success-
fully resisted the condemnation and sale of his vessel as a prize of war
after it was caught in the U.S. blockade of Cuba during the Spanish-
American War. The opinion begins with the premise that
"[international law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and ad-
ministered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determi-
nation."' 32 While this statement is hardly extraordinary-courts having
articulated similar sentiments uncontroversially for at least a century-
one can perceive in the facts of the case an impending judicial quandary.
The Paquete Habana flew the flag of Spain, a nation with which the
United States was at war. Unlike in The Nereide, the international
claims made by the individuals in this case placed the judiciary in the
position of potentially interfering with America's military operations
against an enemy.
The Court applied three dualities in its effort to resolve the inherent
conflict between the national interest and international legal rights, or
between sovereignty and internalization. First and foremost was the
public/private distinction, articulated in an embryonic yet unmistakable
form. The Court then distinguished between internal and external
sources of the appellant's rights, noting that here the President himself
had internalized international legal norms. Finally, the pervasive use of
positive law/natural law language ultimately swallowed up the other rhe-
torical devices employed. It will be helpful to examine each of these in
turn.
1. The Public/Private Distinction
The Court first dissociated the appellant fisherman from the identity of
his flag by asserting that the "coast-fishing industry is, in truth, wholly
pacific, and of much less importance, in regard to the national wealth
that it may produce, than maritime commerce or the great fisheries." '33
The Court further acknowledged that the appellant, like "peasants and
husbandmen," belonged to "a class of men whose ... labor.., is...
32. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
33. Id. at 702 (quoting 2 ORTOLAN, RtGLES INTERNATIONALES ET DIPLOMATIE DE LA
MER 51 (1864)).
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foreign to the operations of war."' 34 After separating the claims of Span-
ish fishermen from Spain's military activity, the Court could then con-
clude that the international law "exemption of coast fishing vessels from
capture is perfectly justiciable. ' 35 The liberal division between public and
private spheres was not clearly articulated at this stage in international
legal discourse. Therefore the Court had to distinguish the particular
circumstances surrounding the coastal fishing industry in order to fur-
ther dissociate the claims of fishermen from "military or naval... neces-
sity to which all private interests must give way."'36 However, the
rudimentary distinction between vessel and flag separated the enemy's
actions from those of private citizens, creating a judicially-enforceable
exemption for the latter "notwithstanding ... the extent of the recog-
nized rights of belligerents" 37 to exercise their sovereign powers of
warfare.
The public/private distinction, even in this nascent form, recharacter-
ized the international conflict as a struggle between state power and indi-
vidual rights, to be managed by the judiciary rather than the executive.
While the Court did not address the legal propriety of military activities,
the internalization of the private rights of fishermen effectively circum-
scribed the war-making power. This seemingly simple move, therefore,
had implications going far beyond its rhetorical pretense.
2. The External/Internal Source Distinction
The second rhetorical device employed by the Court was a somewhat
disingenuous attempt to ground the appellant's claim on an internal vio-
lation by executive officials. By applying the external-source/internal-
source distinction, the Court circumvented the internalization dilemma,
thus transforming the inherent contradiction between sovereignty and
enforceable international restrictions into a question of domestic wrong-
doing by officials within the executive branch. According to the Presi-
dent, U.S. naval forces had instituted a blockade of Cuban ports "in
pursuance of the laws of the United States, and the law of nations appli-
cable to such cases."' 38 The Court then asserted that, by virtue of this
single presidential statement, the body of international legal norms was
placed on a par with U.S. law for the purposes of the blockade,
The Court read the President's announcement to imply that any action
contrary to the law of nations could be treated by the judiciary as some-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 708.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 703.
38. Id. at 712 (citing 30 Stat. 1769 (By the President of the United States of America: A
Proclamation, No. 6, Apr. 22, 1898)).
Vol. 12.:63, 1987
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thing akin to a federal offense.39 The Court acknowledged that the ac-
tual executive orders entailed "specific declarations of certain rules for
the conduct of the war by sea, making no mention of fishing vessels." 4
Thus it considered the President to have bound U.S. forces in their oper-
ations by the general rules of international law much as they were bound
by U.S. legislation.4' The Court's decision may be interpreted less as an
attempt to recharacterize the legal issue than as an effort to alleviate judi-
cial pressure by equating internalization with the exercise of sovereign
power.
The external-source/internal-source distinction, while achieving a
semblance of analytic clarity, fails to meet the challenge posed by the
appellant's claim of right. That is, the President, in applying interna-
tional law to foreign affairs, did not specify who was to be the interpreter
and arbiter of disputes arising from international claims. The President's
message could have been read as implying his acceptance of international
law-providing a basis for judicially-enforceable claims against the state
and restricting absolute sovereignty. Conversely, the presidential state-
ment could have been interpreted as defining international law as a fo-
rum in which sovereignty remains intact and the executive is the ultimate
interpreter and enforcer of the nation's collective interest. The Court, in
assimilating the President's speech concerning the nation's external rela-
tions to domestic positive law, effectively masked the conflict between the
executive and judicial branches. It is possible that the Court's own rec-
ognition of the deceptive character of this approach resulted in its limit-
ing the external/internal line of analysis to two paragraphs within a
fifteen-page opinion, making it a secondary footing on which the majority
decision was based.
39. Id. at 716 ("This case involves the capture of enemy's property on the sea, and execu-
tive action, and if the position that the alleged rule proprio vigore limits the sovereign power in
war be rejected, then I understand the contention to be that, by reason of the existence of the
rule, the proclamation of April 26 must be read as if it contained the exemption in [its] terms
...."). The dissent posed the issue as one of determining whether the Secretary of the Navy
acted outside the scope of his delegated authority by seizing a coastal fishing boat, thus giving
rise to a species of administrative law claim.
40. Id. at 712. The Court cites 30 Stat. 1770 as containing the executive orders (By the
President of the United States of America: A Proclamation, No. 8, Apr. 26, 1898).
41. It is relatively settled that U.S. legislation is capable of governing the actions of U.S.
forces abroad, even in violation of international law. Cf The Over The Top, 5 F.2d 838 (D.
Conn. 1925) (court asserts power to enforce statute mandating Coast Guard operations beyond
internationally-recognized territorial sea).
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3. Positivism and Natural Law
Unlike in the early nineteenth century, when the judiciary restrained
sovereign power in the name of reason and natural right,42 the Court in
The Paquete Habana deliberately classified the protection of coastal fish-
ermen as a requirement of positive law. As is the case in most interna-
tional law discourse, the Court supported this judgment by constant
reference to sovereign consent. 43 Thus, although there was no treaty
governing the particular incident under consideration, the Court engaged
in a lengthy survey of U.S. treaties that acknowledged an exemption of
coastal fishermen from capture. To support further its finding of positive
law, the Court noted that all other seafaring nations consented to such a
rule in their domestic law and treaty arrangements. "Like all the laws of
nations," the majority reasoned, "it rests upon the common consent of
civilized communities," and "is of force, not because it was prescribed by
any superior power but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of
conduct."44
The application of the international positivist theme, like reliance on
an internal source of law, dissipates the conflicts created by internaliza-
tion. The Court rationalized that, even if non-domestic norms were im-
posed to limit the exercise of sovereign power, the source of these norms
is none other than the consent of the sovereign itself. This rhetorical
sleight of hand, however, obscures the picture. After all, the entire body
of international law is not being internalized, but only those particular
rules which in certain circumstances translate into a claim of individual
right. Thus, expressions of humanitarian concern, grounded in the natu-
ral rights implicit in the human condition, supersede the rhetoric of sov-
ereign consent and transcend the need for state concurrence. In one
remarkably schizophrenic sentence, the Court concluded that "by the
general consent of the civilized nations of the world, ...founded on
considerations of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men,...
coast fishing vessels ... are exempt from capture as prize of war. '" 45
42. See, e.g., Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 161, 167 (N.Y. Ch. 1816), in
which a New York statute which provided for the diversion of a stream, but failed to provide
compensation to the property owner, was not enforced on the ground that "this great and
sacred principle of private right" (i.e., compensation for a taking) could not be violated. The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 388, may to a certain extent be seen as an international law
parallel to this idea.
43. See, e.g., The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at 18 (Sept. 7)
("International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 'established in order to regulate
the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achieve-
ment of common aims."); see also infra note 60.
44. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 711.
45. Id. at 708.
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The mix of sovereign consent with undeniable humanitarian impulses
makes for a curious interplay of positivism and notions of natural right.
Although natural rights are never explicitly defined, the Court exempts
persons pursuing the "absolutely inoffensive, and deserving" 46 and "emi-
nently peaceful" 47 industry of coastal fishing from capture not because of
any positivist agreement or acquiescence by heads of state, but because
"the principles of equity and humanity"48 demand it. As described by
the Court, Spain and the United States, acting out of self-interest, may
have consented on behalf of their nations to positive rules of international
conduct. Yet under these particular circumstances, the general agree-
ments are displaced by the notion that failure to honor the private ex-
emption accorded the fishermen would be inhumane.
By introducing the public/private distinction, The Paquete Habana
represents a first step toward the application of the liberal adjudicative
paradigm49 to customary international law. Generally, the rhetoric of
broad international norms maintains the image of state sovereignty by
allowing most foreign affairs decisions to remain under the control of the
executive branch. Yet beyond the discretion of the sovereign lie certain
humanitarian norms which the Court internalizes as natural rights and
as necessary outgrowths of the human condition. This positive law/nat-
ural law dichotomy permeates the discourse and provides the conceptual
framework in which the rudimentary public/private distinction can
operate.
C. Salimoff v. Standard Oil
The distinction between judicial and executive enforcement of custom-
ary international norms, or between claims that can and cannot be inter-
nalized, received its ultimate expression in the recognition cases of the
1920's and 1930's. This line of case law culminated in 1933 with the
decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in M. Salimoff & Co. v.
Standard Oil Co. ,o which considered the effect in the United States of a
Soviet decree nationalizing all oil lands within the Soviet Union. The
case was brought by former Russian landowners against the eventual
purchasers of oil extracted from their lands. In Salimoff, the divergence
of de facto judicial recognition from de jure executive recognition
presented a dichotomy between those notions of right that established a
46. Id. at 707 (citing I. NEGRIN, ELEMENTARY TREATISE ON MARITIME INTERNA-
TIONAL. LAW (1873)).
47. Id. (citing P. FIORE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1885)).
48. Id.
49. See infra text accompanying note 59.
50. 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
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boundary between the individual and state, and those notions that did
not circumscribe sovereign power.
All of the recognition cases operate in a rhetorical environment in
which the act of recognition establishes the sovereign character of the
recognized government. U.S. courts have held repeatedly that, under in-
ternational law, recognition is a crucial factor in determining the validity
of a state's acts.5 1 Recognition thus preserves sovereign control by re-
quiring consent to membership in the international community, and, at
the same time, limits unilateral action by restricting the exercise of sover-
eign self-determination. Accordingly, Judge Cardozo asserted that rec-
ognition might be denied a sovereign where the requisite, though
discretionary, act of recognition by other sovereigns has not occurred:
"Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may be viewed as no
government at all, if the power withholding recognition chooses thus to
view it."152
The distinction between de jure and de facto recognition in Salimoff
simultaneously preserves and displaces the executive decisional process
as the sole means of assessing international legal claims. The plaintiffs,
Russian nationals, argued that "the confiscatory decrees of the unrecog-
nized Soviet government and the seizure of oil lands thereunder have no
other effect in law on the rights of the parties than seizure by bandits." 53
The court, however, asserted a distinction between the "refusal to recog-
nize Russia as a country with which the United States may have diplo-
matic relations" and the fact that the Soviet authorities are "not
unrecognizable as a real governmental power which can give title to
property within its limits."' 54 Thus the court, consistent with the duality
in international law, required a different analysis for the determination of
title to property than that which is applied generally to the acts of unrec-
ognized governments.
The court minimized the distinction between the treatment of nations
in diplomatic relations in general and in specific conflict situations in-
volving property rights by way of a deceptively simple dichotomy, that of
de jure and de facto recognition. The point of the exercise, of course,
was to mask the perceived conflicts between international legal doctrines
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF "i UNITED
SrA'rEs § 94(1) (1965) ("By an act of recognition, a state commits itself to treat al entity as a
state or to treat a regime as the government of a state.").
52. Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York, 239 N.Y. 158, 165, 145 N.E. 917, 918
(1924).
53. M. SalimoX & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. at 223, 186 N.E. at 680-81 (1933)
(citing Luthor v. Sagor [1921] 1 K.B. 456).
54. Id. at 227, 186 N.E. at 682.
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and property or tort law. Ironically, in accomplishing this task, the judi-
cial and executive branches were portrayed as having reversed roles, with
the former stating empirical political realities, while the latter was con-
fined to abstract considerations of law. The court appeared to leave the
weighty and purely legal decision with the executive branch, while ap-
propriating for itself the task of authoritative recognition in the guise of
merely acknowledging indisputable facts. It therefore acquired deci-
sional power by minimizing its own role in affording defacto recognition
to the Soviet Union. "As a juristic conception, what is Soviet Russia?"' 55
the court asks in an almost sarcastic voice. "We all know that it is a
government," the answer plainly asserts; "[t]he State Department knows
it, the courts, the nations, and the man on the street."'56
The assertion of judicial authority through the de jure/de facto distinc-
tion not only confines sovereign recognition to the sphere of international
relations but also removes from the executive de jure decision the deter-
mination of individual rights. In a doctrinal sense, it transforms the
court's analysis of the Soviet nationalization decree from a question of
international law to one addressed by the rules of conflicts of law. Once
the court recognizes de facto Soviet authority, it may hold that any re-
covery in conversion by the former title holders is "dependent upon the
laws of Russia" as the proper "place of the wrong." 57 This jurisdictional
approach to the Soviet acts avoids the need for substantive judicial con-
sideration of the Soviet confiscatory measures and the consequent judi-
cial evaluation of the character of a foreign sovereign. As a result, the
court assumes a more classically liberal posture in drawing boundary
lines between conflicting assertions of private rights.
Furthermore, by separating the issues of international recognition
from both the validity of a government's domestic acts. and the impact of
such acts on the rights of its own constituents, the court avoids direct
curtailment of U.S. sovereign power. This partial internalization (or,
perhaps more accurately, this non-internalization) of the international
recognition doctrine portrays as intact the executive power to grant or
withhold recognition at will. The rhetoric proclaiming self-evident
truths deflects attention from the indirect curtailment of external sover-
eignty by creating separate forms of judicial and executive recognition.
Thus, restructuring the recognition question in terms of choice of law
sets out the basic de jure/de facto distinction, which, in turn, disguises
55. Id. at 226, 186 N.E. at 682.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Riley v. Pierce Oil Corp., 245 N.Y. 152, 154, 156 N.E. 647 (1927)).
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the conflict between the national interest and individual proprietary
rights.
The dual recognition doctrine in Salimoff corresponds to the public/
private and positivist/naturalist distinctions found in The Paquete Ha-
bana. The Salimoff court's differentiation between those recognition
questions within the authority of the executive and those within the deci-
sional capacity of the court parallels the distinction between public and
private international law. Moreover, the court traced the de jure status
of a foreign government to positive sovereign consent, while portraying
its defacto status as a condition that no sovereign could fail to acknowl-
edge. "The United States government," the court declares, "has refused
diplomatic recognition as one might refuse to recognize an objectionable
relative, although his actual existence could not be denied."58 In
Salimoff, the court views international law in two distinct ways: (1) as
public, positive law in which de jure determinations are the prerogative
of the executive; and (2) as a collection of private, natural rights whose
implementation goes beyond sovereign consent and is properly a judicial
matter.
The approach taken in Salimoff, distinguishing personal property
rights from U.S. sovereignty, foreshadows the dichotomy between
human rights doctrine and international law in general. With respect to
the former, the rhetoric of self-evident rights allows the court to mediate
the contradiction between the interests of the individual and those of the
nation. Yet the language of executive control over foreign affairs and
sovereign consent to international obligations dominates the rest of inter-
national law. This dichotomy reflects two distinct visions of the struc-
ture of the international legal system. The human rights vision is
familiar in that it conforms to the paradigm of liberal legality in which
individual rights limit state action and both parties are akin to private
holders of conflicting rights. International law focusing on sovereign
control, however, seems less familiar, since discussion of group rights
and legal interests which subsume the individual within the collective is
less prevalent in the Anglo-American legal tradition.5 9
58. Id. at 226, 186 N.E. at 682.
59. Self-governing American Indian tribes exemplify this latter type of legality in U.S. law.
Throughout American history, Indian tribes have been said to constitute distinct political
communities of a "national character," Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 536, 559 (1832),
such that they not only retain inherent powers of internal self-government, but exercise those
powers in a legal environment free of constitutional review by the federal judiciary. Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1896) (murder indictment in Cherokee tribal court need not
conform to fifth amendment requirement of indictment by grand jury). This power of self-
government continues to exist, at least insofar as the tribal powers have not been abrogated by
treaty or federal legislation. Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 94 (8th Cir. 1956).
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In the international context, these differing visions may be traced to
two alternative theories of legality. The first is known in international
law parlance as "consent" theory.60 It finds its closest domestic parallel
in the pre-Civil War notion of the constitutional compact, 6' which char-
acterized the union as a multilateral device to which "each state acceded
as a state," and in which there is "no common judge, each party having
an equal right to judge [the constitutionality of another party's acts] for
itself."' 62 According to this model, "sovereign power is absolute," so that
"the exercise of the one sovereign power cannot be controlled by the ex-
ercise of the other."'63 In the case of a conflict between sovereign inter-
ests, "mutual confidence, discretion, and forebearance can alone qualify
the exercise of the conflicting powers." 64
Imagine the sense of contradiction experienced by members of the Native American Church,
whose pursuit of traditional Navajo rituals involving peyote received first amendment protec-
tion against state and federal laws, State v. Whittingham, 19 Ariz. App. 27, 29, 504 P.2d 950,
952 (Ariz. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974), but whose communal religious expression
received no protection against the Christian-dominated tribal council when the council banned
the hallucinogenic substance on the tribe's collective behalf. Native Am. Church v. Navajo
Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th Cir. 1959). The two forms of legal argument-
individual rights against the American liberal state and communal advancement by the tribal
government--embody distinct and insulated modes of discourse which, when brought together
in the way demanded by the Navajo traditionalists' claim, reveal an insurmountable
contradiction.
60. Discussions of the sources of international law frequently point to the consent of sover-
eigns. See, e.g., supra note 43 and accompanying text. The consent theory may be seen as a
defense mechanism set up in international discourse against an Austinian positivist critique of
the concept of law in the absence of an overarching sovereignty. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROV-
INCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 201 (1954) ("[Llaw obtaining between nations is law
improperly so called .... "). Thus, in the sources of doctrine pertaining to treaties, it is
generally said that "the legal basis of... conventions, and the essential thing that brings them
into force, is the common consent of the parties." Reservations to the Genocide Convention
Case, 1951 I.C.J. 32 (Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Hsu Mo, JJ., dissenting). Similarly, in the
doctrinal pronouncements on the binding source of international custom, the emphasis is gen-
erally placed on an identification of a "constant and uniform usage, accepted as law," Asylum
Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 277 (implying a generalized, but nevertheless consen-
sual, basis of the legal obligation). The idea is to counterpoise sovereign consent against the
otherwise natural law image of international norms which somehow transcend sovereignty.
61. It is not uncommon for courts to refer to international law rules in resolving controver-
sies among the states in the federal system. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361
(1934) (state boundary follows navigable channels of Delaware River and Delaware Bay);
Handly's Lessee v. Anthony, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 374, 374-75 (1820) (Kentucky state boundary
created by Virginia land grant extends only to low water mark of Ohio river). It is less com-
mon, however, to attempt to find an explanation for international law in theories of federalism.
Nevertheless, the attempt is made here.
62. Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW 501 (1830),
quoted in 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 213
n.1 (3d ed. 1858).
63. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 370-71 (1819) (arguments of
counsel).
64. Id.
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The most obvious parallel between such constitutional pronounce-
ments and public international law is the absence under a compact the-
ory of a judicial arbiter for international disputes. 65 Each sovereign
participating in the system represents the interests of its entire constitu-
ency, allowing legal action based on unlimited sovereign power. In a
vision of federalism or international legality premised on a sovereign
compact, disputes are not assimilated to the paradigm of justiciable
resolution which adjudicates conflicts between private rights. Rather,
various co-equal sovereign communities define legality through coopera-
tion and self-imposed forebearance from intrusive actions. Although the
advent of the system of judicial review and, ultimately, the Civil War put
an end to any application of the compact theory to the structure of
American federalism, the rhetoric of sovereign consent and cooperation
retains its dominant place within the sphere of international relations.
The second conception of international legality, suggested in The Pa-
quete Habana and Salimoff through their depiction of state action as
corresponding to contested individual rights, encompasses the human
rights dimension of international law. Its closest parallel in U.S. consti-
tutional theory may be found in John Marshall's version of popular sov-
ereignty. In his view, the people of the United States established a
constitution, not a confederation, so that "the government proceeds di-
rectly from the people."' 66 The American federalist notion that sover-
eignty resides in the people as a whole rather than in individual states
denies the states the right to withdraw from the overall federal system.
Central to the internalization of international norms, however, is the im-
plication that "[t]he Constitution gave to every person having a claim
upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court of the nation. '67
The people are envisioned as having exercised "an original right to estab-
lish ... such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their
own happiness," and, in so doing, as having "prescribed limitations" on
the government's sovereign power.68 The enforcement of these limita-
tions is said to be "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department. ' 69 At the heart of international human rights is a parallel
portrayal of all of humanity, regardless of state affiliation, as comprising
65. The international system, of course, does provide mechanisms for the judicial resolu-
tion of disputes between sovereign powers in the form of the International Court of Justice and
other specific tribunals. These institutions, however, are said to have no decision-making pow-
ers except those granted by explicit sovereign consent. See, e.g., STATUTE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JusTICE arts. 35-36.
66. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403.
67. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383 (1821).
68. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
69. Id. at 177.
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the ultimate source of legality and reserving for itself certain protections
that restrict state action.70
The rhetoric of power versus right transposes state actors and their
subjects from a relationship of sovereign consent and voluntary
forebearance to one which circumscribes state action. Although these
two alternative and contradictory modes of defining legality remain unar-
ticulated in the case law, the shifts in judicial terminology and discursive
style seen in Salimoff are part of an ongoing process of developing tech-
niques to manage this deeply-ingrained conflict. The gap between an in-
ternational legal regime of absolute sovereigns and one of internalized
international norms which are judicially implemented against states rep-
resents the fundamental divide which the courts struggle to cross in in-
ternalization cases.
D. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
Perhaps the most renowned internalization case in recent years, and
certainly one of the few to deal explicitly with international human rights
law, is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.71 Filartiga held that a U.S. federal court
had jurisdiction over tort claims brought against the Inspector General
of the Asunci6n, Paraguay police by the family of a prisoner tortured to
death by the Inspector General in his headquarters. Although the de-
fendant appears to have been deported from the United States prior to
the appellate decision, the plaintiffs72 and the defendant were all present
in the United States at the time the action commenced. The court, which
found federal jurisdiction on the basis of the Alien Tort Claims Act, en-
gaged in a lengthy exploration of whether torture by a state official could
be considered a "violation of the law of nations" as required by that stat-
ute.7 3 Judge Kaufman explained that an examination of "the sources
from which customary international law is derived-the usage of nations,
judicial opinions and the works of jurists"-leads to the conclusion not
only that "official torture is now prohibited by the law of nations," but
that the previous belief that "'violations of international law do not oc-
70. See, e.g., Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172 (1947) (crimes
against humanity); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (war crimes).
71. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. The plaintiffs were Dolly Filartiga and Dr. Joel Filartiga, the sister and father of the
actual torture victim, Joelito Filartiga. Id. at 878.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1983) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States.").
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cur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the acting state,' is clearly
inconsistent with the current usage and practice of international law." '74
This judicial implementation of human rights law provides the interna-
tional cognate to Marshall's conception of popular sovereignty. Thus,
although Judge Kaufman surveys the law on torture to determine the
existence of a positive prohibitory norm-a "general assent of civilized
nations" 75-the norm itself suggests a natural prohibition against "any
state from permitting the dastardly and totally inhuman act of tor-
ture."' 76 The very manner in which the court expresses the right and
defines its source suggests that such universal rights may be judicially
enforced and affirms the internalization of this legal restraint on state
action. The binding effect of the norm is expressed not so much as a
matter of American, Paraguayan, or any other particular sovereign na-
tion's consent, 77 but more as a function of the inevitable applicability of
human rights to social situations and political arrangements. Accord-
ingly, enforcement is portrayed not as a question of the external relations
of cooperating sovereigns, but as the delineation of a boundary between
sovereign power and the sovereign's own constituents.
Conclusion
In attaching the notion of rights to individuals, the Filartiga court ex-
acerbated the division between the "public" international relationships
among states and the "private" impact of state acts on individuals. This
division, in turn, corresponds to the dichotomy between executive and
judicial implementation of international law. The assimilation of certain
international conflicts to the liberal adjudicative paradigm of contending
individual rights, and the coinciding exclusion of other disputes as em-
bodying conflicting national interests which are resolvable only by way of
cooperative sovereign consent, is the central theme in the ongoing pro-
cess of the internalization of international law. It is within the liberal
paradigm that the rhetoric of individual right is used to manage the con-
tradiction between sovereignty and internalization, allowing the judicial
implementation of international norms. Thus, the indeterminacy appar-
ent in the contemporary case law reflects the existence of two distinct
visions of international law, which in turn correspond to the two domi-
74. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (quoting Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir.
1976)).
75. Id. at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694).
76. Id. at 883 (citing Declaration on the Protection of All Persons fromn Being Subjected to
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doe. A/] 1034 (1975)).
77. The court did note in passing, however, that both the United States and Paraguay have
explicit anti-torture provisions in their respective constitutions. Id. at 884 nn.13-14.
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nant strands of early American federalist thought. When examined in an
historical perspective, the lack of internal coherence in the overall body
of case law can be traced to the emergence of various rhetorical tech-
niques which attempt to synthesize these deeply-rooted, competing
visions.
